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Kent Greenawalt's Religion and the Constitution is rich and 
wide-ranging, edifying and well argued. This short discussion will 
simply bring out some problems needing further reflection. This 
is done with the hope that it will lead to clarifications from 
Greenawalt, and it will enable me to highlight elements in my 
view that contrast with parts of his. 
I. THE NOTION OF A RELIGIOUS REASON 
Greenawalt's treatment of the definition problem regarding 
religion is highly plausible. He shows that, in relation to religion 
and politics, we must govern our thinking largely by paradigms 
and essentially undisputed cases. Moreover. both in political phi-
losophy and in crafting legislation, we have more to fear from 
definitions that are too narrow and therefore limit protection of 
religious exercise than from definitions that are too broad and 
therefore overextend its protection. Any attempt to explicate the 
notion of a religious reason will be limited by the clarity of the 
accompanying conception of religion itself. My points, however, 
will be independent of differences among plausible characteriza-
tions of religion. 
In one place Greenawalt says, "When I say that reasons for 
action are not religious, I mean that the reasons do not connect 
to religion or that the person making the choice perceives the 
connection as weak. "1 Earlier he said he is "interested primarily 
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in motivations that do not flow from answers to religious ques-
tions."' He does not note that reference to reasons for action 
may also designate considerations that support the action or pro-
spective action in question- these considerations have often 
been called normative reasons. They represent the category to 
which ''public reasons" belong, at least when the public reasons 
are genuine (see, e.g., pp. 498-99). A normative reason for hav-
ing a law might be that it protects religious liberty; a motivational 
reason for supporting that law might be a desire to protect reli-
gious liberty. Since the latter reason may also be expressed by 
citing an accompanying instrumental belief-say, that the law 
will protect religious liberty-it should be clear that a motiva-
tional reason for action can in a sense embody a normative one. 
This is the content of the belief which, given the desire just cited, 
can both motivate and explain actions supporting the law. 
We must distinguish the religious from the non-religious for 
both kinds of reason.3 The short characterization quoted does 
not fill that need. Consider motivational reasons first. 
One problem is that the clause "or ... the person making 
the choice perceives the connection [to religion] as weak" does 
not express a sufficient condition for a reason's being non-
religious. People can mistakenly think there is only a weak con-
nection between their desire to outlaw same-sex unions and their 
religion, when in fact that desire rests on a belief that God con-
demns those unions. I believe Greenawalt actually works with 
the significant connection criterion, which (apparently intention-
ally) he leaves open-ended and which I find plausible so far as it 
goes. What I want to propose is that we not include connections 
of content. Believing that a law will protect religious liberty ex-
presses a reason that is contentually religious, but it is not prop-
erly called a religious reason for supporting the law, since en-
dorsing the reason is fully justifiable on non-religious grounds. 
Suppose, however, that we do call the reason religious. We can 
still distinguish it from a reason religiously grounded in the way a 
desire to outlaw same-sex unions might be. It is religiously 
grounded reasons, not contentually religious reasons, that raise, 
if not the most difficult problems in the normative theory of re-
ligion and politics, then those most controversial. 
2. ld. at 147. 
3. A detailed account of types of religious arguments and religious reasons is of-
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What of normative reasons, which are facts or at least ab-
stract elements like propositions? These can certainly be conten-
tually religious; but, apart from being held or otherwise figuring 
in someone's psychology, they are not motivational. Such rea-
sons (like certain motivational ones) can be evidentially religious, 
in the sense that justification of the proposition in question de-
pends on knowledge of, or justification for beliefs about, God or 
another religiously important source. If someone thought that. 
say, same-sex unions degrade the soul, a case could be made that 
this claim- which is a prima facie reason for action- is eviden-
tially religious. There could, however, be a non-religious meta-
physical reason for the position. The claim is not, then, intrinsi-
cally evidentially religious, as is the related claim that God 
punishes anyone who does such things. But by far the most likely 
basis on which the claim would actually be accepted (at this 
point in history) is theological. 
For Greenawalt, both motivational and normative reasons 
are important. The former are crucial for appraising the conduct 
of individual citizens, the latter for framing an adequate ethics of 
citizenship. Other ways in which both are important may be ap-
parent in the next section. 
II. THE PLACE OF RELIGIOUS REASONS IN 
POLITICAL CONDUCT 
Greenawalt has done much to clarify the notion of a public 
reason as developed since Rawls made the term prominent." 
Greenawalt's succinct characterization captures what many in-
tend by the term: Public reasons are those "accessible in the 
right way to all citizens" (p. 498). The contrast is with ''reasons 
grounded in religious premises"' (p. 498)-a kind best under-
stood as intended to be normative and, like virtually any abstract 
considerations, usable in arguments whether they are motivating 
or not. 
My point here is clarificatory. Greenawalt's next paragraph 
begins: 
People who challenge the injection of religion in politics 
adopt what we may call an "exclusivist'" position. Religion 
should be excluded from politics. In the politics of pluralist 
4. For an instructive discussion of Rawls"s conception of public reasons and re-
lated notions. see Kent Greenawalt. What Are Public Reasons 7 • 1 J.L. PHIL & Ct:LTCRE 
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liberal democracies. decisions (they claim) should be made on 
grounds that are shared premises of that form of government 
and on forms of justification and ways of determining facts 
that are accessible to all citizens (p. 498). 
Unwary readers might think the position described in the third 
sentence is exclusivist in the strong sense implying that religion 
has no place in politics, as the injection metaphor readily sug-
gests. But the position proposes a basis of decision, not a con-
straint on the content of discussion. 
Since my own view has been called "exclusivist," I should 
say that it is not exclusivist in the strong sense in which religion 
has "no place" in politics and is also much more moderate than 
the position just described concerning bases of decision. My 
"principle of secular rationale" (which I now prefer to term "the 
principle of natural reason") is that "citizens in a free democracy 
have a prima facie obligation not to advocate or support any law 
or public policy that restricts human conduct, unless they have, 
and are willing to offer. adequate secular reason for this advo-
cacy or support" (e.g. for a vote).' First. my view does not re-
strict religious expression in public contexts (though I emphasize 
the discretion needed for determining when and how to express 
religious views in politics). Second, it allows religious reasons to 
play both a justificatory role in political argument and a strong 
motivational role in political conduct. It overlaps the view just 
quoted only insofar as that view implies obligation to have ade-
quate secular (natural) reason for coercive laws and public poli-
cies." Accessibility in the relevant sense does not imply ade-
quacy. but accessibility and sufficiency for justification together 
do, and their combination might be intended in the best state-
ments of the view-call it a shared premises view-Greenawalt is 
describing. 
It should be clarifying to note that, drawing from virtue eth-
ics. I have proposed a standard that supplements the principle of 
secular rationale. This second standard, which is closely related 
to some positions Greenawalt explores, posits a prima facie obli-
gation not to support coercive laws or public policies unless in 
doing so one is sufficiently motivated by adequate secular (natu-
5. This formulation is drawn from ROBERT AUDI. RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND 
SECL:LAR REASO:'-< R6 (2000). 
6. In ··Natural Reason. Secularity, and Neutrality Toward Religion" (in prepara-
tion). I explore Thomas Aquinas's conception of natural reason. connect it with my con-
ception. and consider the relation of natural reasons to what I have characterized (epis-
temically) as secular reasons. 
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ral) reason (hence is not simply rationalizating. e.g. concealing 
religious motivation). Greenawalt articulates a problem for this 
kind of standard. "Most people ... could not disentangle what 
they believe because of underlying religious convictions from 
what they would believe if they relied only on premises of liberal 
democracy and shared techniques of understanding" (p. 505). 
Does this plausible point undermine the secular motivation 
standard? 
First, the question pertinent to my position is whether some 
adequate set of secular (natural) reasons is motivating for a par-
ticular act; determining this does not require surveying even all 
one's normative beliefs, much less one's belief system as a whole. 
It may require considering only a few beliefs. Second, my view 
does not presuppose an available set of "premises of liberal de-
mocracy," and it leaves open many appropriate normative con-
siderations. (Unlike Rawls. I do not rule out all "comprehensive 
views."7) Third, in the normal case in which we offer an adequate 
reason for something and take it to provide adequate support-
which is how we normally will view it when we sincerely propose 
it as a justification- there is a strong psychological presumption 
(for normal persons) that we are motivated by it.x Fourth, in 
cases where we ought to question whether we are motivated by a 
secular consideration, we need not ask whether we would be-
lieve the conclusion we take it to support if we did not believe 
the religious propositions we regard as supporting it (a point 
Greenawalt's language suggests he appreciates); the question is 
whether we would still believe that conclusion if we did not rely 
on those propositions. Normally, a positive answer is supported 
by one's focusing clearly on the secular consideration, reflecting 
on its relation to the conclusion, and having a sense of holding 
the latter on the basis of the former. Such self-examination does 
not require excluding the influence of religious considerations: 
we can and often do hold a view for two or more individually 
sufficient motivating reasons. This kind of cognitive motivational 
overdetermination is matched by a similar kind in the psycho-
7. See Robert Audi. Moral Foundations of Liberal Democracv. Secular Reasons 
and Liberal Neutrality Toward the Good. 19 NOTRE DA\IE J.L. ETHICS & PL:B. POL.; 
197 (2005). which provides a conception of comprehensive views on which thev are not 
necessarily objectionable bases for supporting coercive laws or public policies. · 
8. If we consider only rational persons. then a kind of integration is implied such 
that a stronger thesis is warranted. to the effect that there is a necessarv relation between 
(I) believing a proposition and. with that in mind. focusing on a consideration one con-
siders a reason for believing it. and (2) tending to believing it at least partly on the basis 
of that reason. Similar points apply to reasons for action. 
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logical grounding of desires and attitudes. Fifth, suppose this fo-
cal reflection test yields a false positive. An excusability condition 
for non-compliance with the motivation standard is failure of a 
conscientious effort to find and be motivated by an adequate 
natural reason. This kind of effort is salutary in itself in arriving 
at decisions to pass coercive laws. Sixth, the motivation principle 
is in any case less important than the rationale principle. If one 
has. but is not motivated by, adequate secular (natural) reason, 
at least there is such a reason. Hence laws or public policies 
based on that reason- regardless of who offers it or whether its 
proponents are motivated by it-will at least be justifiable by it. 
In those special cases in which one sincerely offers a reason for a 
view without being motivated by it, it is nonetheless true that, 
like a bridge support that needs only to be slid into its proper 
place to sustain the roadway above, the reason stands ready to 
enter one's motivational system. 
III. LIBERTY AND TOLERATION AS 
DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 
My last topic is the specific place of liberty as a standard of 
political conduct. In discussing the appropriate grounds for tak-
ing something to be sufficiently harmful to warrant restrictions 
of conduct, Greenawalt says: 
[P]eople should be as free to rely on their religious convic-
tions as on nonreligious intuitions in respect to factual ques-
tions about which science or social science provide no con-
vincing answers. If the evidence is scanty on what happens to 
otherwise healthy individuals who happen to engage in sexual 
relations with animals .... religion may properly play a role 
in influencing judgment about harms to voluntary actors ... 
(p. 534). 
My question here does not concern whether people should be 
··free to rely on ... religious convictions" if that means they have 
a moral right to. Like Greenawalt, I think there is such a right. 
But surely we can act wrongly-say by making no charitable 
contributions-even if we have a right to act so.9 Greenawalt 
might accept this point, but I apparently differ in holding that, 
without an adequate natural reason for coercion, liberty should 
be the default position in a sense implying that one should ab-
9. This point (which Greenawalt can accept) is argued in detail. in the context of 
an account of the notion of a moral right. in Robert Audi. Wrongs Within Rights. 15 
PHIL. ISSCES 121 (2005). 
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stain from supporting (e.g.) the law or public policy in question. 
Let me clarify. 
We should ask whether such questions as what constitutes a 
human person are "factual." In my view they are- though meta-
physical- factual in the sense that they have truth-valued an-
swers, but not ''scientific." in the sense that scientific inquiry is 
the proper route to answering them (this does not imply that sci-
entifically revealed information is irrelevant to them). What 
Greenawalt says here does not commit him on how we should 
proceed if, where our evidence accessible to natural reason, say 
philosophical and scientific evidence, is inconclusive, we want to 
support legal coercion. My position is to take liberty as the 
proper default position. This of course allows that purely relig-
ions convictions may be an ethically proper basis for persuading 
others to do what one may not coerce them to do. 
Let me conclude by suggesting two principles that seem 
consistent with Greenawalt's position and support mine. It 
should add clarity to use the notion of epistemic peers: roughly, 
persons who are (in the matter(s) at hand) equally rational. pos-
sessed of the same relevant evidence, and equally conscientious 
in assessing it. Rational disagreement between epistemic peers 
can occur, between religious and secular persons, inter-
religiously, and intra-religiously. To be sure, if we consider a dis-
putant an epistemic peer and we wish to retain our position, we 
should seek new evidence for it or a least find a basis for think-
ing the disputant is not as rational or as conscientious in apprais-
ing the issue. But-as Greenawalt realizes-at times the most 
reasonable conclusion may be that there is epistemic parity and. 
partly for that reason, the disagreement cannot be readily re-
solved in one's favor. 
Is the skeptical conclusion that neither party is justified the 
appropriate response to finding oneself in a situation of persist-
ing disagreement with an apparent epistemic peer? I doubt that. 
There could be a difference in the disputants' conflicting justifi-
cations that one simply cannot discover. Should we, however, 
always suppose that this is so and that our own view is rationally 
preferable? A quite different response is humility: minimally, 
concluding that we might be mistaken or at least less justified 
than our peer. In any event, such a response is also supported by 
the idea that in liberal democracies liberty is the default position. 
With all this in mind, I propose a 
Principle of rational disagreement: The justification of coer-
cion in a given instance is inversely proportional to the 
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strength of the case for epistemic parity among dispu-
tants who disagree on whether coercion in that instance 
is warranted. 
It should be evident that this principle is supported, as are other 
elements in my view, by considerations of reciprocity. The prin-
ciple is certainly in the spirit of "Do unto others as you would 
have them do unto you." 
The principle does not specify how weak the justification for 
coercion becomes as the case for parity becomes stronger. I be-
lieve the need for toleration becomes dominant if the case is 
conclusive. This is partly because the justification for coercion in 
a given instance approaches zero as the strength of the case for 
epistemic parity among disputants who disagree on whether the 
relevant coercion in that instance is warranted approaches con-
clusiveness. In this light, we can formulate a more specific prin-
ciple: 
The principle of toleration: is it not reasonable for propo-
nents of coercion in a given matter to consider them-
selves epistemically superior to supporters of the corre-
sponding liberty, then in that matter the former have a 
prima facie obligation to tolerate rather than coerce. 
The value of this principle depends on the conscientiousness of 
those who would coerce. If unconscientious, they would readily 
think it reasonable to take defenders of the liberty in question to 
be less than their epistemic peers. If conscientious, they would 
be quite wary of taking this view. Indeed, highly conscientious 
government officials-or virtually any conscientious, rational, 
and tolerant person with coercive power-will, if unopposed by 
actual disputants, try to think of the best hypothetical defense 
they can construct in favor of the liberty they would restrict or 
eliminate. 
In politics and law, it is a great merit of honest, sustained ra-
tional discussion that it helps its participants to approach parity 
on the issue in question. The more we rationally discuss an issue 
in the light of all the considerations we think relevant, the more 
we can learn from one another. Where disagreement persists, we 
may possibly be justified in believing that our interlocutor is not 
our epistemic peer in the matter, but believing this might well be 
unreasonable, particularly regarding issues on which major 
thinkers have long labored, taken account of one another's 
views, and failed to agree. Liberty is not only a constitutive value 
of liberal democracy; it also has inherent value, not just instru-
2008) GREENAWALT ESSAYS 257 
mental worth. The principle of toleration reflects these points. 
and it supports the view that coercive laws and public policies 
should be justified by adequate natural reasons. It does this, in 
part, by supporting the view that liberty should be the default 
position in a liberal democracy. It does not strictly entail that 
view, however, nor is it entailed by the view. I find myriad evi-
dences for the principle of toleration in Religion and the Consti-
tution. In this and in many other ways, the book contributes not 
only to political and legal philosophy but also to our understand-
ing of democracy and the ethics of citizenship. 
